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A new paradigm within the field of the Sociology of Religion is being 
aggressively promulgated by a number of leading Sociologists in the USA. 
Based on theories drawn from contemporary laissez faire economics, rational 
choice learning theory and drawing upon a wide array of empirical data, the 
new paradigm challenges the prevailing secularization theory's prediction of 
a steady decline in religion in the modern world. However, a number of 
concerns, have been raised about the new paradigm, including the claim that 
instead of saving religion from the threat of secularization, it subverts it by 
assuming an implicit secular motivation in religious behaviour. In the 
following, some of the key elements of the paradigm are examined in the light 
of a number of these critical concerns. It is concluded that while it offers 
helpful explanations at the macro level of the "religious economy", at the 
meso (organizational) and micro (individual) levels there is good cause for 
concern. 
Introduction 
A new paradigm within the field of the Sociology of Religion is being 
aggressively promulgated. Originating within the United States of America, its 
main advocates are Rodney Stark, Professor of Sociology and Comparative 
Religion at the University of Washington, Roger Finke, Professor of Sociology at 
Pennsylvania University, and Lawrence R. Iannaccone. Their paradigm is based on 
theories drawn from contemporary laissez faire economics, a sophisticated version 
of rational choice understandings of human behaviour and a vast array of empirical 
data relating to what Stark and Finke have called the "rise and fall of religious. 
firms" (Finke & Stark, 1992). They present it unhesitatingly as the answer to the 
prevailing secularization model which predicts the steady decline of religion in the 
wake of modernization. But does it ultimately pass the test of a paradigm in terms 
of being a "pattern, exemplar, example which adequately accounts for its subject 
matter" (Onions, 1980:1507)? One of the main opponents of the new paradigm 
claimed that it distorts religious behaviour to the point "that the only context in 
which it would be viable: is a thoroughly secular society" (Bruce, 1993:194). If 
this is the case, then rather than being the source of optimism for religion, it 
becomes the 'Phantom Menace' that ultimately will destroy what it purports to 
save. 
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To test the utility of the new paradigm, I will first examine a number of the 
key concepts as set out in Stark and Finke's most recent and up-dated presentation 
(2000) of their evolving (Stark & Bainbridge, 1980, 1985, [1987] 1996; Finke & 
Stark, 1988, 1992; Stark, 1996, 1998a, 1998b)"theoretical quest" (2000:83). In the 
light of their cautionary remarks (2000:27) and the considerable amendments that 
they have made (2000:83-4) to the paradigm, I will concentrate upon this latest 
version of their work. 
Following this, to identify where there are problems in the paradigm and to 
assess how serious these are, I will examine some of the reservations that a number 
of its supporters have expressed as well as investigating the challenge offered by 
one of its fiercest opponents. Finally, to test if the paradigm is truly what it claims 
to be, a paradigm and not a metaphor, and to assess if it is as threatening as Bruce 
suggests, a question will be addressed to it. 
I. Some Key Elements In The New Paradigm 
Contrary to the prevailing theories of the increasing secularization of 
societies undergoing modernization and the progressive decline of religious 
institutions, Stark and Finke predict a healthy future for religion wherever a free 
religious market is permitted to operate. In economic terms, the problem of the 
perceived decline in religious institutions is not related to a decline in the demand 
for religion and particularly not for what they have called elsewhere "vivid, costly 
and otherworldly" religion (Finke & Stark, 1992:275). Rather, it is a problem of 
supply. For example, the mainline denominations within Christianity have 
abandoned their traditional consumers and have moved 'up-market'. This is the 
essential dynamic that moves religious organizations from sect to church. What 
Niebuhr (1929) identifies with movement within the class structures and which 
would constitute a shift in 'demand', Stark and Finke identify as related to 
'supply'. In other words, the mass of consumers have not changed their taste, but 
the suppliers have. As a result of this analysis, Stark and Finke believe that they 
have identified the actual mechanism for this sect to church movement 
(Iannaccone, 1988). Their new paradigm of the 'religious economy', is set out in 
detailed definitional and propositional form in Acts of Faith. A religious economy 
is defined as follows. 
A religious economy consists of all the religious activity going on in any 
society: a "market" of current and potential adherents, a set of one or more 
organizations seeking to attract or maintain adherents, and the religious 
cultures offered by the organizations. (Stark & Finke, 2000:282) 
1. From Sect to Church 
Religious organizations are defined m relation to their sociocultural 
environments. 
Churches are religious bodies in relatively low tension with their 
surroundings ... Sects are religious bodies in relatively high tension with their 
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surroundings. Tension refers to the degree of distinctiveness, separation, and 
antagonism in the relationship between a religious group and the "outside 
world. (2000:261) 
As newly emerging religious organizations become successful, there is a 
tendency to reduce the tension with the surrounding sociocultural environment in 
response to pressure to adjust their religious stance to a more moderate and less 
sect like position. This pressure comes from a number of sources, but is 
particularly increased by the emergence of a professional clergy class and 
increased centralized bureaucratic control. Critical to these developments, is the 
influence of theological seminaries. Their influence is almost always deleterious 
for the well being and vitality of their founding churches. As a result of this 
pressure, the organization moves "up-market", abandoning its original fertile place 
in the market in favour of an already over-serviced niche among the religious 
sophisticates who desire a more abstract belief system. However, "free-riders" 
(Olson, 1965; Hechter, 1987:27) guarantee a diminishing return of social goods 
(Douglas, 1986) for those who are actively involved at the level of the local 
congregation. Disillusionment often causes these active workers to either seek a 
more vital and rewarding group where costly involvement is demanded of all 
(Iannaccone, 1992, 1994 ), or to break away to start a new movement, recapturing 
the old vitality and effectiveness in the main religious market. Strong 
congregational democracy and a "flat" organizational structure are important 
inhibitors to the "up-market" tendencies of the professional clergy, bureaucrats 
and, above all, the seminaries (Stark & Finke, 2000:164-167; Finke & Stark, 
1992: 185). 
2. Free Pluralist Markets. 
Unregulated religious market economies encourage pluralism in religious 
providers. This in turn brings about a higher participation level by consumers. 
Proposition 75. To the extent that religious economies are unregulated and 
competitive, overall levels of religious commitment will be high. (Conversely, 
lacking competition, the dominant firm[s] will be too inefficient to sustain 
vigorous marketing efforts, and the result will be a low overall level of 
religious commitment, with the average person minimizing and delaying 
payment of religious costs). (2000:284) 
Religious monopolies can only survive with strong support by the State. 
When this support is withdrawn, there will be a time lag for desacralization as the 
market adjusts to the new situation. This time lag, according to Stark and Finke 
(2000:200-01) accounts for religious situations in Europe and parts of South 
America where there is nowhere near the same vigor in the religious economy 
compared to the USA. Australia could easily be added to the list of the countries 
lagging behind the USA. 
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3. Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory is a basic tenet that underpins the paradigm. Drawing 
upon the work of Simon (1957; 1982), March (1978), Becker (1975; 1976; 1996), 
Coleman (1990), Boudon (1993), Iannaccone (1990; 1991; 1992; 1994; 1995a; 
1995b; 1997a; 1997b), Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) and see also Stark, 
Iannaccone and Finke (1996; 1998), Stark and Finke formulate the principle of 
human rationality as follows: 
Within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted by 
available options, guided by their preferences and tastes, humans attempt to 
make rational choices. (2000:38) 
In other words they claim to be making the assumption that people make their 
religious choices "in the same way they make their other choices, by weighing the 
costs against the benefits" (2000:85). 
They also claim that their "thick" (Ferejohn, 1991) definition of rationality 
takes into account the role of the emotional and expressive aspects of religion, and 
mystical experiences. 
(W)e have paid close attention to emotional and expressive aspects of what is 
a particularly emotional and expressive phenomena - to in some measure 
capture the sense of"religion as poetry" (Greeley, 1995). Specific provision is 
made for religious emotions, and for ritual, prayer, sacrifice, miracle, mystical 
experiences, for bargaining with gods, and even for religious procrastination. 
Our aim is to construct a theory in which both phenomenologists and rational 
choice theorists can take comfort. (2000:83-84) 
However, they define subjective religious experience as "belief in, and 
knowledge of, the explanations sustained by a religious organization and having 
the appropriate emotions" (2000: 1 03). Feelings are closely linked to, and appear to 
be consequent, to beliefs. But this does not seem to take into account the many 
cases where an intense experience of the supernatural precedes, and is contrary to, 
prior beliefs or expectations. While mystical experiences are defined as "some 
sense of contact, however fleeting, with a god or gods" (2000:280), their role in 
the shaping of beliefs is not explored. 
While a wide range of ecstatic and mystical experiences is fully recognized, 
their meaning is acknowledged only in terms of confirming religious explanations. 
"Not surprisingly," the authors claim, "such occurrences are taken as direct 
evidence of the truth of religious explanations" (2000: Ill). At the broadest level, 
this is self evident in that people seek explanation for the experience that has 
befallen them. But these experiences can be as much germane for beliefs and 
explanations as they are produced by them. We will return to this point later in the 
discussion. 
Consistent with a very cerebral approach, one that assumes some form of the 
weighing of options in order to optimize gains, the case of the altruistic sacrifice is 
entirely ruled out of court. 
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This formulation (of choosing the most reasonable option)) leaves explicit 
leeway to act in ways that others would define as "unselfish" choices, but it 
leaves no leeway for altruism, if that term is defined as intentionally 
selecting a negative cost/benefit ratio purely for the benefit of others. 
(2000:39) 
In one bold sweep, a whole tradition of religion and the ideals of selfless 
servanthood are sacrificed on the altar of rational choice theory. While the authors 
may argue that they are only describing the way that people choose preferences 
(2000: 113) it would seem that some preferences are a-priori dismissed. 
The helpful aspect of their approach is that it "presents people making 
decisions for themselves, not as unthinking automata. It emphasizes agency, rather 
than structure, and portrays people as active participants in their own lives" 
(Spikard, 1998:102). However, the paradigm moves all too easily from asserting 
that people act rationally to assuming that their motivation is for economic or 
personal gain. This slippage is seen in the motivation assigned to clergy who are 
defined as "professional ecclesiastics" (Stark & Finke, 2000:283) who "will seek 
to improve the ratio of their rewards to costs". Therefore "to the extent that 
ecclesiastics enjoy a favorable reward ratio, religious motives will be less 
important among those entering the position" (2000:283). On the other hand, if 
"the secular rewards of religious vocations decline then religious rewards must 
play an increasing part in the motivation of those who pursue such vocations" 
(2000:286). It is one thing for the paradigm to predict behaviour, it is quite a 
different thing for it to assume motivation. 
As Spikard has pointed out in his discussion of the various types of social 
action that he has drawn from Max Weber ([1922] 1978) and others, one ought to 
remember "not to argue from the success of the model to the reality of its 
constituent elements" (Spikard, 1998: I 05). 
4. Belief Systems 
Defining religion as "consisting of very general explanations of existence, 
including the terms of exchange with a god or gods" (2000:278), the authors 
consider that the primary religious question is, "What do the gods 
want?"(2000:96). The answer to this question will be determined by what is 
believed about the god(s). Beliefs about god(s) therefore become central to their 
paradigm as these bear directly on the factors relating to the cost or price of the 
religious benefits to be obtained. These factors include: 
Competition: 
The greater the number of gods worshiped by a group, the lower the 
price of exchanging with each (2000:96). 
Dependability: 
In exchanging with the gods, humans will pay higher prices to the 
extent that the gods are believed to be more dependable (2000:97). 
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Goodness: 
Good gods are those that intend to allow humans to profit from their 
exchanges (2000:97). 
Evil gods are those who intend to inflict coercive exchanges or 
deceptions on humans, resulting in losses for human exchange 
partners (2000:98). 
Inconsistent gods are those who alternate unpredictably between 
benign and evil orientations toward humans (2000:98). 
Responsivity: 
Scope: 
In exchanging with gods, humans will pay higher prices to the extent 
that the gods are believed to be more responsive (2000:98). 
The scope of the gods refers to the diversity of their powers and the 
range of their influence (2000:98). 
The greater their scope and the more responsive they are, the more 
plausible it will be that gods can provide otherworldly rewards. 
Conversely, exchanges with gods of smaller scope will tend to be 
limited to worldly rewards. (2000:99) 
Exclusivity: 
In pursuit of otherworldly rewards, humans will accept an exclusive 
exchange relationship - one in which the human may exchange only 
with one specific God (and approved subordinate gods and angels) 
(2000: 100). 
But, no matter what the belief system, humans, in good mercantile manner, 
"will seek to delay their payments of, ... (and) to minimize, their religious costs 
(2000: 1 00). 
This somewhat doleful (the pun is intended) view of the human/divine 
exchange leaves open a whole series of questions about what is the product that is 
being sought by both parties in the exchange not to mention what the meaning of 
"faith" would be. These issues will be explored later. But Stark and Finke's 
formulation does have the advantage of covering all possible exchanges - save that 
of altruism. For example, when the prophet Micah poses the question 
With what shall I come before the Lord" 
And bow before my God on high? 
Shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves a year old? 
Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, 
And ten thousand rivers of oil? 
Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, 
the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? 
and receives the response: 
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He has told you, 0 Mortal, 
What is good 
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And what does the Lord require of you 
But to do justice, and to love kindness, 
And to walk humbly with your God? (Micah 6:6-8 NRSV) 
Both his question and the response suggest costs that are equally valid as 
religious costs in Stark and Finke's paradigm. 
But this raises a critical issue. What is the nature of "religion" that is being 
presented here? Religion, as simply a calculation against profits and losses, seems 
to be little more than the Devil in disguise, a Phantom Menace that constitutes the 
worst of human fears that the gods are little more than human nature projected 
onto the heavens. Ultimately, there is only pragmatism. In their attempt to assert 
the continuing health of religion, have the authors destroyed something essential in 
the nature of religion itself? While it is not in the province of sociology to make 
judgements about the nature of the supernatural, it none the less has a 
responsibility to at least do justice to the nature of the religious experience. 
The level of generalization necessary for a grand theory cannot encompass 
the mass of detail that is required for analysis at lower levels of abstraction, but it 
does need to provide explanations that are consistent with both the theory and 
human experience. In this case, Stark and Finke make the assumption that all 
religious decisions must by nature be self-interested calculations rather than 
simply calculations. Therefore, despite the experience of at least some religious 
practitioners, Stark and Finke are compelled by their theory to deny the possibility 
of the choice of self-sacrificial behaviour based purely on the presumption that the 
ultimate good is to deny oneself for the sake of the other. This does not imply an 
irrational choice. It is as rational and calculating as any other human decision, but 
it is not necessarily self-interested calculation. 
As we have seen, Stark and Finke's application of the paradigm also rules out 
the element of surprise, the experience that comes unexpectedly and which 
challenges accepted understandings at both the individual and collective level. 
Their initial qualified statement that "given their information and options, humans 
generally act in a rational way (2000:21, emphasis mine) appears to have become 
the absolute statement "humans always act ... ". What is more, they always act in a 
self interested way. What the authors present to us, then, is religion as an ongoing 
series of self interested exchanges conducted within the framework of a set of a 
fairly fixed beliefs. The changes that do occur in the belief system, take place on 
the basis of optimizing the returns to be gained. 
While this does describe some forms of religion, it does not encompass the 
full range of religious experience. In fact, the paradigm presented by Stark and 
Finke, far from preserving religion from the reductionism of the secularizationists, 
appears to do the very opposite. It presents a picture of religion as totally a human 
product based on self interest. If this is so, it would contradict entirely the authors' 
own protestations that sociology must take seriously religious phenomena and the 
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experiences of those who are religious and not explain them away (2000:33-4). 
The outcome of their present formulation of the paradigm is that religion is treated 
as just one more human economic rationalist activity. Viewed cynically, it could 
be said that the paradigm presents a most congenial interpretation of religion for an 
era dominated by economic rationalism. 
My contention is that the paradigm does not need to be this restrictive. It 
could just as easily accept that experiences and emotions could give rise to, as well 
as be shaped by, "beliefs and ideas". Nor does the paradigm have to embrace a 
concept that rational choice always implies behavior based on personal 
cost/benefit analysis, rather than (as the authors themselves assert) "that it is 
generally based on cost/benefit analysis and is therefore rational behaviour in 
precisely the same way that other human behaviour is rational" (2000:56, 
emphasis mine) 
II. Unmasking The Menace 
A number of the paradigm's (somewhat cautious) supporters have also 
expressed some major reservations concerning its validity. These will be examined 
in the light of the above critique. 
1. Built in, and mainly for, the USA? 
One of those who has expressed reservations is R. Stephen Warner. Not 
withstanding the fact that he claims to be one of the progenitors of the new 
paradigm and still supports its general thrust, Warner (1997:90; 1993:1058) has 
raised two major concerns. In fairness to him, it must be recognized that his 
reservations were published in articles written prior to the publication of Acts of 
Faith. Nonetheless, his criticisms of the earlier versions (Stark, 1997; Stark & 
Bainbridge, [1987] 1996; Finke & Stark, 1992) are pertinent. 
In the most recent of his writings, Warner (1997) expresses concern with the 
"Rational Choice Model of Religion" on two grounds. The first he describes as a 
"substantive" criticism and this refers to its scope. He considers that the "open 
market" analogy works well for the religious situation in the USA where he 
believes that the major function of religion is to provide social space for cultural 
pluralism. (1993:1058; 1997:90). In this environment the open market operates 
particularly well because it falls within the '"distinctive institutional parameters of 
the US religious system (Warner, 1993:1080), rather than in every society" 
(Warner, 1997:89). 
This conviction grew out of his own extensive field work experience (1983; 
1988; 1990; 1992; 1994; 1995) in which he observed a variety of congregations of 
different theological stances and even religious faiths. And this was confirmed in 
the reports of the field work of a wide range of other researchers (Warner, 
1997:93; Bouma, 1979). 
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He notes (1997:92) that in the congregations he studied, ministers who 
emphasized strictness were not particularly successful in mobilizing their 
congregations to follow their demanding leadership. This was true for both 
conservative (in the 1970's) and liberal (in the 1980's) leadership. In addition, 
he draws attention to the studies conducted by Hoge and Roozen (1979) which 
did not support Dean Kelly's theory (1972) that the reason for the sudden and 
unexpected increase in membership in conservative evangelical Churches was 
related to an emphasis on "strictness". 
Warner concludes that "strictness" is not necessarily the key ingredient in 
attracting people. He cites the case of the Southern Baptist Church which Stark 
and Finke have used as an example of one denomination that has to some extent 
been able to resist the pressure to move to a position of less tension with their 
environment (Finke & Stark, 1992). But Warner (1997:92), citing Holifield 
(1994), points out that the Southern Baptists were only able to maintain its 
numerical strength by "a considerable relaxation of standards for membership in 
good standing". This is not necessarily fatal for Stark and Finke's case as they 
acknowledge in Proposition 84 that: 
When free market conditions prevail, given the relative size of niches, at any 
given moment, religious bodies based on medium tension niches will enroll 
the largest portion of the population. (2000:285) 
However, Warner goes on to reflect: 
I suspect that there is very little popular taste for strictness, per se. In my 
research, what is essential to religious vitality is for leadership to keep in 
touch with the grass roots, and insofar as "strictness" means adhering to 
prosaic rather than convoluted hermeneutics, it can promote such connection. 
(Warner, 1997:93) 
He does agree with Stark and Finke, however, in the belief that the 
seminaries provide a dis-service to their churches in this process. 
Thus I think Finke and Stark are onto something when they intimate that 
seminaries insulated from grass roots constituencies promote church decline. 
The people in the pews seem to have no interest in the rationalization and 
demystification that seminaries chronically promote (Warner, 1997:93). 
So far as the masses who constitute the main segment of the religious market, 
relevance to their needs rather than strictness is the key attraction. _ 
A taste for "strictness" appears to be more characteristic of elites, or what 
Weber calls religious "virtuosi," than of the religious masses, who provide the 
ultimate resource base for churches. What the masses seem to want in 
religious teachings are messages that speak to their needs instead of the 
intellectual needs of elites. Insofar as religious masses are organized into 
pluralistic communities, they want their cultures, not the cultures of elites, 
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upheld. But I see very little evidence that they are attracted to strictness. 
(1997:93) 
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Therefore Warner makes it plain that he is much more comfortable with the 
"supply side" of the paradigm than with the "demand-side" (1997:92). But he 
considers that this "supply side" paradigm to be more appropriate to the United 
States where barriers to entry to an open religious market are low and the culture is 
supportive to this because "religion (is) a respected, popular, and to a great extent, 
protected idiom" (1997:95). 
In other words, the culture legitimates the ideology of free market 
competition in all aspects of society including the religious economy. This role of 
culture as an independent variable in the religious economy does not appear to be 
taken seriously in the new paradigm. The failure of most countries to move rapidly 
into a free market religious economy as state control is removed, is not just a 
matter of cultural lag but one of cultural choice. The religious free market is an 
ideological pursuit rather than an inevitable result of deregulation. 
2. The House That Homo-Economicus Built 
The second of Warner's reservations concerning Stark and Finke's 
development of the new paradigm, relates to methodology. He disagrees with the 
deductive path that Stark and Finke have taken to develop their theory. Rather than 
taking Karl Popper as the guide to formulating theory, he believes that Carl 
Hempel provides a more effective and inductive method. 
I understand "theory" to be an intellectual structure that bridges empirical 
observations instead of a thought process that produces hypotheses that are 
"refutable-in-principle." In my own case, the new paradigm emerged from 
sustained reflection on what I and others had observed, particularly in our 
field research on American religious communities, rather than "from working 
out the logical implications of first principles. This inductive process is the 
methodological issue that I will focus upon, for it was an inductive process 
that led me to my circumscribed synthesis of the new paradigm. (1997:89) 
This concern with theory is echoed by a number of other sociologists who 
would still regard themselves as supporters, in one form or another, of the new 
paradigm. 
Nancy Ammerman is one of those who supports the new paradigm but shares 
Warner's concern about the use of rational choice theory to explain religious 
behaviour. However, her criticisms relate to the over-emphasis upon rationality, 
the way the model has borrowed indiscriminately from another branch of the 
social sciences, and the fact that it tries to explain everything. She writes: 
I am wary of any theory that apparently posits rationality as its central 
premise. I am aware that rational choice theorists can define rationality quite 
broadly, but there is still a real danger in assuming that human social life is 
best understood in terms of cognition and reason, leaving aside intuition, 
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affect, transcendent experience, and the like. These omissions seem 
particularly serious when it comes to religion.( 1997: 120) 
However, she recognizes that "designating religious choices as rational may 
be a needed corrective" (1997:120). This is certainly a major point made by Stark 
and Finke who dedicate a major portion of Acts of Faith (2000:1-82) to exposing 
and refuting the prejudice and bias of the secularizationists. Among these they 
include many, if not all of, the founding fathers of sociology and psychology. They 
point to the long history of the denigration of religion within the human sciences 
and those who have denied the validity of religion. It has been regarded as 
ignorance (Hobbes), human projection (Feuerbach), a reflection of society 
(Durkheim), illusion - an opiate (Marx), psychopathology/neurosis (Freud), 
primitive mind set (Lucien Levy-Bruhl), irrationality (Hume), a psychological 
property of individuals (Weber), the product of "authoritarian personality" 
syndrome (Adorno), or (among contemporary secularizationists) as a flight from 
modernity (Hunter, 1983; Bruce, 1986); -to mention just a few of the stances 
taken. 
Stark and Finke draw upon a wide range of contemporary research to 
demonstrate that religious groups consist of normal, intelligent (above the average, 
in some cases) people who make their decisions about religious life in the same 
way that most human beings make decisions about any aspect of life. They claim 
that the bias against the rational nature of religious choice has blinded sociologists 
to what is actually happening, in some cases even as to the meaning of their own 
research. 
On this, Warner strongly agrees with them. Commenting on his experience in 
reviewing current research in the nineteen eighties and nineties, he writes: 
I was able to send off for scores of empirically based conference papers, and 
had time to correspond with their authors ... I gathered voluminous articles of 
variety, vitality, and flexibility in US religious institutions - Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, evangelical. liberal, and feminist; white, black, and 
Asian ..... 
But I also encountered confusion and bewilderment among their authors, 
many of them young scholars working on masters' theses, dissertations, or 
first books. They had been rightly admonished by their mentors to connect 
their discreet studies to wider theory, but the theory most of them had been 
taught, the "Sacred Canopy theory" of Peter Berger (1969) gave them little 
help (Warner, 1993: 1 048). Based on European notions of secularization, 
Berger's theory told them to expect religious particularism in the backwaters 
of society, but like Ammerman and myself, they were finding it in midstream. 
Too many of them wasted valuable intellectual energy trying to create room 
for their observations within the basically inhospitable intellectual confines of 
the old theory; they reminded me in some respects of Copernicus grappling 
with Ptolemy. Moreover confronted with findings of flexibility and novelty in 
American religion - "me'n' Jesus" spirituality, home based small groups, 
egalitarian minyans, women clergy, inclusive language, de-facto 
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congregationalism - they were too inclined to interpret such innovation as 
evidence of the accommodation predicted by secularization theorists; for 
whom any deviation from elite defined orthodoxy constitutes "worldliness". 
(Warner, 1997:93) 
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One of the great benefits of the new paradigm is that it has released sociology 
from the shackles of the ideology of the past. Implicit within that ideology was a 
concept of constant progress to a new society free from the prejudices and 
restrictions of religious dogma. However, this ought not to distract us from the 
even more critical question, Is the new paradigm any less destructive to a 
comprehension of religious experience today? Have we exchanged one 
prejudice for another and both are just as inimical to religion as the other? Or is 
this the same old secular prejudice in disguise? 
The new paradigm has borrowed a secular and powerful metaphor from 
another branch of the social sciences. It is the metaphor that dominates 
contemporary thinking about the nature of human beings and society -viz. 'Homo 
Economicus' and its attendant concept of the 'market'. Ammerman draws 
attention to the dangers of this. 
My other major reservation about rational choice theory, however, has to do 
with the use of economic metaphors, capturing in a common sense way the 
dynamics of much of what we do. But the very fact that they seem so 
commonsensical makes me suspect that what we have here is a grand 
metaphor that uses one major cultural symbol to explain other cultural symbol 
systems. Its strength as metaphor may give rational choice theory a good deal 
of explanatory power, but not necessarily the predictive power it claims. Its 
strength may derive from the dominance of this metaphor in contemporary 
society, not from, any inherent characteristics of human beings. (1997:120) 
Stark and Finke steadfastly insist that the new paradigm is not a metaphor but 
reflects the way things are in reality and has great explanatory power. 
Our application of economic language to things often regarded as "sacred" is 
meant neither to offend nor as mere metaphor. Rather we shall show the 
immense explanatory power that can be gained by applying elementary 
principles of economics to religious phenomena at the group or social level -
an application pioneered by Adam Smith more than two centuries ago. 
(2000:36) 
I have two difficulties with this statement. First, it does not restrict the 
paradigm to explaining the "group or social level". Because the paradigm is built 
at the micro level on rational choice theory, it includes individual motivation and 
experience of religiosity. Despite its best attempts, what it assumes is the way 
religiosity is dealt with by the individual which looks very little like what many 
people experience. Not that people are irrational in religion; it is just that the 
economic metaphor does not catch so many of the nuances of religious experience. 
What we need is a model of "homo religiosus" that is much more comprehensive 
in its assumptions about human experience. 
102 Australian Religion Studies Review 
My second difficulty relates to the uncritical way that Stark and Finke use the 
metaphor from economics. While acknowledging that they are borrowing a 
metaphor, they claim that their "application of economic language ... is meant ... 
(not) as a mere metaphor" (2000:36). The metaphor is, of course that of 'economic 
man' who is an abstraction created by isolating out certain factors from human 
behaviour that relate to the pragmatics of survival. But there are other aspects of 
human behaviour that have quite different nuances. Some of these relate to 
religious experiences. While Stark and Finke recognize the existence of these, they 
predicate them upon rational activities, particularly beliefs. This is appropriate for 
some activities but quite inappropriate for others, particularly those relating to the 
experiences of the supernatural (what Otto calls the "numinous"), and for the 
phenomenon of self-sacrifice. To impute rational self interest motivation to these 
phenomena is to explain them away in much the same way as Freud, Marx, 
Durkheim, etc. have. Yet these are the very people that Stark and Finke criticize as 
not taking religious experience seriously. As Stephen Bruce has pointed out, the 
irony of economic or rational choice models applied to religion is that, ultimately, 
they secularize their subject matter. 
If one considers what sort of society it would be in which economic models of 
religious behavior worked well, the answer must be one in which religion (the 
supreme producer of cultural limitations on economizing) no longer matters at 
all. (Bruce, 1993:205) 
This comment confirms my suspicion that any theory that claims to explain 
everything needs to be treated with great caution because it will usually finish up 
explaining away the issues in question. It also points up sharply the dilemma of a 
secular social science using its criteria to "explain" phenomena that lays claim to 
non-secular explanations. 
3. The Mystical Magical Market 
Sociologist, Mary Jo Neitz, writing in collaboration with the economist Peter 
Mueser, also rejects the validity of the rational choice model. 
We do not accept, however, the methodological and theoretical exclusivity 
that rational choice theorists promote along with their findings. We believe 
that the rational choice perspective cannot provide a full picture of religion. 
(Neitz & Mueser, 1997:106) 
They reject the rational choice dimension of the paradigm on both theoretical 
and practical grounds. 
They critique the use of Popperian standards of "providing falsifiable 
presuppositions by which a theory can be tested" which have been so 
enthusiastically embraced by Stark in his 1997 article. They go on to explain: 
We wish to suggest that while the generation of falsifiable implications plays 
an important role in the development of scientific theory, adherence to the 
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formal structure common to rational choice models is neither necessary nor 
even sufficient for theoretical progress. It is now widely recognized that, 
contrary to the implications of Popper's argument, no single definitive test 
succeeds in causing the rejection of a theory. Even as Stark was adopting 
Popper as his standard of science in Sociology, Thomas Kuhn (1962) was 
arguing that in the natural sciences, the development and adoption of a theory 
rested on a complex process not adequately described in the much celebrated 
"scientific method" .... Ironically, the rational choice assumption, so central 
to economics, has now been squarely refuted in controlled experimental 
environments (Thaler, 1991). Nevertheless, economists are unwilling to 
discard it. (Neitz & Mueser, 1997:114) 
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In a footnote in his recent book Debunking Economics, Steve Keen (2001) 
tells in a footnote ofR. Caplan's attempts to explain findings 
which show that experimental subjects do not conform to the neoclassical 
definition of rational. Rather than accept that the neoclassical definition of 
rationality may be flawed, Caplan proposes that irrationality may be a good 
which people "consume" like any other and then uses an irrationality-
rationality trade off using indifference curves. (2001:263) 
Keen suggests that "rational behaviour as economists define it is simply 
impossible in the real world." (200 I :263), And a similar cautionary note is 
sounded by the sociologist, Carl L. Bankston III (2001), in a review of Acts of 
Faith. 
(T)he religious market place, like the market place in commodities is driven 
as much by irrational pressures such as desire to maintain individual and 
group identity and fears of outsiders as is by traditional economic values. 
When many economists, such as Robert Frank, are beginning to recognize 
the sociological nature of economics, sociologists might be wary of 
adopting models of behaviour drawn from classical economics. (2001:333) 
Zafirovski in his examination of the basis of rational choice theory in 
classical and neo-classical economics, concludes that the theory has not recognized 
the significant impact cultural factors play in the actual market place. He joins 
with the others we have already noted (Warner, Neitz and Mueser, Ammerman 
etc.) in sounding a warning of the problems in borrowing the theory from 
economics. 
(Even) the celebrated mechanism of automatic utility -, profit - or wealth-
optimization often appears as no more than a peculiar facet of institutional 
maintenance rather than an expression of some ingrained propensity to 
exchange, maximize, and calculate or selfish genes of a natural born homo-
economicus. Simply, the mechanism of utility optimizing or rational choice is 
a variable or empirical problem to be explained in most social terms, not a 
constant universal assumption or self evident axiom ... (2000:467) 
Along with Ammerman (1997), Neitz and Muesner suggest that only an 
ethnographic approach of the study of religious groups can provide a way out of 
104 Australian Religion Studies Review 
the dilemmas of rational choice theory (1997: 116). As a case in point, they provide 
the outline of a feminist critique of the rational choice model. They point to a 
number of sources for this including Paula England's analysis (1989:21) that 
rational choice theory is a very masculine (i.e. separatist and autonomous) as 
opposed to a feminine (relational and connected) model (1997:109). 
Stark and Finke would respond that their definition of rational choice does 
embrace these aspects and others such as race and class as well, because it 
recognizes that a wide diversity of niches exist within the market to cater for these 
needs. "We postulate the existence of a stable distribution of diversity of religious 
demand and identify clusters of persons with shared preferences in market niches." 
(2000:198) Therefore factors such as emotion, gender, class, and race do not have 
to be dealt with at the level of the paradigm itself. 
However, I am again inclined to agree with their critics that despite their 
protestations that they are now (2000:37) using a "thick" or complex definition of 
human rationality, the strong impression is that the emotional and relational 
aspects are subsumed under the cognitive. There is no sense of intimacy in the 
relationship with the gods. All is reduced to calculated transactions. 
I want to return to this matter later, but first I want to draw attention to the 
heated debate between the Secularizationists and the Supply Siders - to borrow 
Bruce's description (2001) ofhis opponents. 
4. Reflections in a Looking Glass? 
This clash has been dealt with fully elsewhere (Rose, 200 I), and it centres 
around the interpretation of the historical and contemporary data. Rather than deal 
with this fully, I wish only to draw attention to the fact that both sides have 
attacked the other's use of statistical data on rates of religious adherence and 
attendance, particularly in countries usually thought of as highly secularized. 
The Supply Siders claim to have uncovered data for European countries, such 
as Britain, which demonstrate that religion is not in decline, but traditional 
Christian churches are. Bruce (2001), however, has responded with other, equally 
impressive, data to prove this is not the case. He draws attention to the fact that, 
despite there now being more religious groups than previously recorded in Britain,' 
rates of adherence, attendance and allegiance to religious beliefs have all fallen. 
His position is summed up in the following quote. 
Brierley (1999:Table 10.2) ... estimates the total membership of non 
Trinitarian churches ... as having risen from 71,000 in 1900 to 537,000 in 
2000 ... But that seemingly impressive figure amounts to only one sixth of the 
members lost to the main Christian churches over the same period and 
less than one percent of the total number of people who do not belong to a 
Trinitarian Christian church. The new religious movements of the 1970s are 
numerically all but irrelevant. On the most generous estimates, Brierley can 
only find 14,515 members. Knowing that the Unification Church has fewer 
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than 400 members puts the contribution of the NRMs in proper 
context.(Bruce, 200 1:200) 
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Does this suggest that the open market aspect of the paradigm also is 
seriously flawed? Warner (1997) has suggested that there is a forgotten factor that 
enables both sides of the dispute to be right in certain contexts. Reflecting on a 
journey through Europe, he came to the following insight. 
I suddenly realized why the secularization theory that fit the U.S. case so 
poorly had such visceral appeal to European oriented social theorists. In 
Europe, religion is quite clearly a thing of the past, and in Europe, 
disestablishment was a degenerative state of religion. In the United States 
by contrast, religious triumph was recent and religious competition was 
constitutive. ( 1997 :95) 
In short, the culture in each case was different and supported quite different 
attitudes to religious expression. The fact that many of the American style 
religious groups have not had the success in Europe that they have enjoyed in the 
U.S.A is not due to a time lag, but to culturally sanctioned norms and preferences. 
When the role of culture is taken into account as an independent variable, 
both paradigms have validity but in different situations. It is not simply a matter of 
time before Europe becomes a thriving pluralist religious open market. It will 
require a cultural change in the way religion is perceived. 
III. A Case For Quality Control: But What Is The Product To Be 
Controlled? 
There is no attempt by Stark and Finke to recognize the importance of 
regulatory economics in their paradigm other than self-regulation by the market 
itself. The quality of the "product" is never called in question. It would seem that 
one of their central contentions is that other-worldly and costly religion has the 
greatest attraction to the greatest number, while liberal, this worldly, and 
inexpensive religion attracts the intellectual elite. In their earlier work they 
describe the former type of religion as "other worldly", "vivid", and "compelling" 
(Finke & Stark, 1992:1) in its practices and doctrines. In their later book, however, 
these terms have generally dropped out and been replaced with the concept of 
maximizing and conserving "religious capital" (Stark & Finke, 2000:120-123). 
Religious capital consists of "the degree of mastery of and attachment to a 
particular religion" (2000: 120). This change has helped move the discussion from 
ideological issues to those that can be more easily investigated and tested. But the 
concept of "religious goods" still remains uncertain. In agreement with 
Iannaccone, ( 1997 a:26), they consider that the "religious demand" is a constant 
within the religious economy, and is located (as already stated) in well established 
niches. 
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Stability consists of the durability of niches in terms of their relative size 
and the character of their demand. Within free market economies, the 
dynamic of niche switching by firms ensures that each niche is effectively 
supplied. (2000: 196) 
But what is the religious need that each niche meets and what are the 
religious products that attract the consumers? 
One of the very illusive aspects of Stark and Finke's writing is to identify 
what is the product that is being traded or exchanged in the religious market, The 
obvious answer would seem to be that it is "religion". But if this is the case, who 
are the producers (manufacturers does not seem quite the right word to use here)? 
Is it the clergy, the congregation as an aggregate, or the members as individuals? 
And are the producers different from the consumers? Or are we to assume that the 
producers are the gods or God? In which case what is the function of the religious 
'firms' (organizations)? Are the clergy the merchants who 'buy in' the product 
from the gods and then peddle it to the consumers?" With tongue in cheek we 
might observe that this would seem to be the very problem that caused the 
Protestant Reformation; and that event can now be restated as a consumer revolt 
which led to the establishment of a new chain of franchise stores where the 
consumers were allowed to have a greater hand in the production of the goods. 
Or are we to think of the "firms" as more like the providers of consumer 
oriented entertainment, the Hoyts and Roadshows of the religious economy? In 
which case, the various providers can be pictured as seeking out that form of 
"entertainment" that will best meet the demands of their particular niche in the 
market, with the Big two (or three) going for the mass box office appeal. The "art-
house" churches would provide for the elite, and the sects would take care of those 
who are looking for RR (Restrictive Religion) entertainment. 
Or perhaps (and the analogies keep suggesting themselves) the religious 
firms are to be thought of as more like the entrepreneurs whose task is to identify 
what is novel on the religious scene and then stage the new event to a novelty 
hungry consumer population. 
In these cases, the role of seminaries and clergy would be fairly clear. The 
seminaries would produce the entrepreneurs, train the operators, and make sure 
that their graduates were fully cognizant of government regulations, and have the 
necessary skills to carry out their tasks. Alternatively, the seminaries could adopt 
the role of both training and censorship, guiding their graduates in what is 
worthwhile and acceptable in the prevailing climate, critiquing the various shows 
that are on offer and generally endeavoring to lift standards. 
I am sure that the "entrepreneurs" of the new paradigm would protest that the 
"product" is the belief systems that are offered by the various religious firms. But 
they also claim that the different belief systems offer different guarantees of the 
outcomes of the exchanges with the god or gods. Some gods are dependable, some 
can offer a much longer guarantee, while others are much more limited or even 
malign (Stark & Finke, 2000:97-100). 
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But dependable in what? To keep their promises! Promises of what? Stark 
and Finke offer various- hints; happiness, health, other worldly rewards including 
life beyond death. This suggests that the religious firm is much more like the mail 
order firm, the call center, or the insurance company, or at worst, a Bank. For, at 
best, none of the religious firms is able to "produce" more than 'this-worldly' 
benefits of belonging (though there is more fun in some than in others). For the 
'other-worldly' products, they are dependent upon the god(s) to provide the sought 
after "goods" and only the most cynical would suggest that the firms have control 
of the god(s). 
Perhaps a more apt analogy for the "religious firm" is that of the mutual 
benefit society, where everybody helps each other through their contribution in the 
immediate situation and with the added benefit of a pay-off in the future. Another 
suggestion is that of the welfare organization where the clergy are the staff who 
exist to bringwell being to the congregation. That welfare could be in the form of 
advice, hand-outs, or encouragement. Or, better still, the voluntary association 
where the staff is employed to assist the members realize whatever the mutually 
agreed goals are. 
My purpose in raising (somewhat facetiously) these issues is to demonstrate 
that the easy analogy of "churches = religious firms" conceals as much as it 
reveals. Once it is recognized that both the "product" sought by the consumer and 
that conceived of by the religious organization, can vary greatly, it is very hard to 
pin down what it is that we are dealing with. 
Neitz and Mueser put their finger on the nature of the dilemma. 
As Iannaccone correctly observes, the production of religious commodities 
differs from the production of more tangible goods in a variety of ways. The 
most basic difference is that the very character of religious output is subject to 
interpretation. Whereas common sense may suffice to measure output of cars 
or shoes (with adjustments for quality or other attributes), simple observation 
is not sufficient to define what is produced in a church. Some kind of theory 
incorporating intent, belief, emotion, and symbolism - all complex conceptual 
categories - is necessary to render the varied activities of church members 
understandable as a religious commodity. Iannaccone's analysis of religion 
cannot even begin without an implicit set of assumptions that allows activities 
of the Sunday service to be distinguished from zen meditation, visits to 
astrologers, or even social interaction at the local bar. (Neitz & Mueser, 
1997:111) 
Stark and Finke have endeavored to meet the sort of criticisms that Neitz and Mueser 
raise, by shifting the "goods" to a higher level of abstraction. The significant thing is no 
longer what specific outcome is sought, only that it is sought. Therefore, the type of "thick 
description" that Neitz and Mueser require is no longer needed. That can happily be left to 
the ethnographers to identify. It is sufficient so far as the paradigm goes that "something" is 
sought from the god(s), the actual nature of the product ceases to be a concern. It can be 
anything that the individual or the "market" requires. 
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This is at one and the same time, the elegant power of the model which is so admired 
(Neitz & Mueser, 1997:117 fn.5) and its weakness. As an abstraction it loses some of the 
nuances that allow different forms of religious motivations and needs to be distinguished. 
Instead it allows all "goods" to be treated alike as "products". This opens the door to the 
crass diminution of "faith" to just one more item among many to be consumed. Does that 
matter? Yes, because that which makes religion more than another consumer product is lost 
in the abstraction. In one sense, it may not matter if the consumer wants a Mercedes or a 
Toyota Corolla. In terms of consumption, they are both cars. But in terms of faith, there can 
be a world of difference between a religion that offers a set of beliefs and one that offers a 
vital encounter with a supernatural being who wants to draw us into the mystery of his/her 
own being. From the point of view of the sociologist, both of these may be treated as 
"faiths" but their quality may not be measured by their popularity. 
If the product sought or offered is a relationship with the god(s) rather than a 
particular benefit (e.g. "eternal life"), then the nature of the exchange is going to take a very 
different form. This is a point well made by Spikard in his discussion of the "cathekontic" 
or relational type of rationality which he distinguishes from the "instrumental" and "value 
oriented" types of rationality. (1998:105). 
And likewise, the sort of religious institution also is going to be very different. As we 
have noted, rational choice theorists can say that the relationship is the "good" sought, but 
to frame the interaction in a mercantile manner will entirely skew the way the product is 
sought and offered. While it is true that sociology is by definition unable to investigate the 
supernatural, including a supernatural relationship, the metaphors it uses will either respect 
the nature of the topic being investigated, or destroy it. 
Stark and Finke's book gives the impression that the product that is really in view is 
the well being of the organization; that is, how to maximize its market share. At this point 
the analogy of the firm and the market works well. But as soon as the focus shifts to what 
the essential nature of the "product" is, the analogy becomes extremely restrictive. 
This is well illustrated, if we return to the concept of "faith". Stark and Finke seem to 
identify this with "belief' and the important role they give to beliefs is well argued. But if 
"faith" is seen as a relational rather than a cognitive concept, then, as I have already 
suggested, the mercantile analogy at best breaks down, and at worst become destructive. 
Research into human development suggests that it is sequential (Fowler, 1981 ). 
Likewise, faith and religious belief are sequentially developmental (Stokes, 1989). Some 
such concept needs to be incorporated into Stark and Finke's "paradigm" (Rose, 2001). This 
would not only add to their understanding of how the religious market works and why some. 
religious organizations move 'up-market', but give a much more rounded understanding to 
the role of seminaries and clergy. The mercenary motivation implicit in their paradigm (and 
made explicit in their 1992 book) may in part be true. But it does not do justice to the 
struggle that seminaries and clergy experience, to be both relevant to the market and also 
faithful to the product. which, in the case of Christianity, is the faith of Jesus, the Gospel. 
Other researchers have recognized that motivations for religious behaviour may vary. 
One schema for identifying these differences is to distinguish between three different 
orientations to religious behaviour; means, end, quest, A recent article by Kristensen et a!. 
(2001) provides details of this approach. Their research has been built upon the initial work 
of Allport (1950) and Allport and Ross (1967) which identified religious motivations that 
were intrinsic to the person's life style and those which entailed using religion to achieve 
other extrinsic goals. Batson eta!. (1993) added the third category of Quest to the other two 
categories on the basis of the observation of "an open-ended intellectual search for answers 
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to grander and more existential, and thus religious, questions." (Kristensen et al., 2001:75). 
The latter conclude their repert of their research as follows. 
The fundamental question guiding this study was how religious orientation, as 
represented in Means, Ends, and Quest relates to the Affective, Cognitive, and 
Conative, components of religion. Taken as a whole, the data suggest that 
there is a strong and consistent relationship among the dimensions of religious 
orientation identified in Batson et a!.' s ( 1993) work and the components of 
religious attitudes. (Kristensen eta!., 2001 :85) 
While these researchers go on to raise questions concerning the 
distinctiveness of the Intrinsic and Quest orientations, what this body of research 
Implies is that there is more than one way to view faith. Stark and Finke need to 
broaden their paradigm to allow for these differences in religious orientation. 
While this may be difficult to do at the level of "grand theory", if it is not done 
then it becomes all too easy for the paradigm to be interpreted so as to include only 
one sort of motivation. This is precisely what seems to be happening in their 
exposition of the paradigm because they attribute only self interested motives to 
the participants in the religious economy. 
Conclusion 
I have sought to give a broad outline of what Stark and Finke have called the 
new paradigm for sociological theory of religious behaviour, and I have looked at 
a number of the reservations and challenges the paradigm has provoked. In 
particular, I have examined the role of the rational choice theory that underpins the 
paradigm's perspective on human behaviour in religion. I have found that the way 
that this has been applied places some major limitations on the usefulness of the 
paradigm. One outcome of this has been that the motivation for religious 
behaviour is attributed to self-serving calculation. 
Likewise, I have tested the paradigm itself to see if it is more than a 
mercantile analogy that is useful but which fails to provide the whole picture. 
When the question of "What is the Product?" is addressed to the paradigm, it 
becomes plain that, it is a mere metaphor of a number of significant aspects of 
religion. ·While it does help to redress the past bias towards the irrationality of 
religion, its usefulness as a broad explanatory paradigm is called into question at a 
number of critical points. 
On the one hand, it is presented as a consistent and self contained system, 
but, on the other, it fails to account adequately for all the phenomena it seeks to 
explain. While it presents on the surface, a far more hopeful future for religion 
than that of the rival secularization model, it ultimately produces an understanding 
of religion that is just as reductionist as the secularization model. While the 
secularizationists reduce religion to irrationality, the advocates of the new 
paradigm reduce it to self-centred rationality. 
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Can the Model be Redeemed? 
For those who feel that neither the secularization model, nor the new Supply 
Side theory as presented by Stark and Finke, are adequate to provide an elegant 
framework for their field work, what is the solution? Neitz and Mueser, as well as 
Ammerman and Warner, all believe that the new paradigm (?analogy) is worth 
retaining and working with. 
As in physics and economics, no set methodology exists by which theory and 
empirical data can be combined to insure the progress in the study of religion. 
Whether or not a theory is explicitly derived from, rational choice 
assumptions, its power, usefulness and plausibility can only be judged in 
terms of a broad theoretical and empirical con.text. The rhetoric in which the 
theory is embedded, the character of the story it tells, is rightly central in 
determining its persuasive power. (Neitz & Mueser, 1997:115) 
How much this will prove to be the case with the Supply Side theory we are 
yet to see. However, a number of points can be made that indicate that there is a 
way forward. 
First, it needs to be recognized that the authors are not claiming that what 
they are presenting is the last word on the grand theory for the sociology of 
religion (though at times the tone of their writing seems to suggest this). And 
while, it would not seem that what is being presented is truly a paradigm of the 
totality of religious behaviour, particularly at the micro-social level, it does 
provide us with a working model of the way the religious economy functions at the 
macro-social level. 
It is not entirely clear what the authors mean by a "paradigm". How does it 
relate to theory? It has been suggested by Spikard, responding to an earlier version 
of the author's work, that what they present is a "model" rather than a theory. 
I believe that we can save the market model of religion from its putative 
assumptions by seeing it as a model not a theory. Rational-choice theorists 
cannot argue that real, empirical people are goal rational at the subjective 
level. Nor can they claim that all people have the same needs. Instead, they 
must argue that if we assume that this is the case, the model that emerges 
corresponds to reality quite well .... A rational-choice model can duplicate 
the overall structure of a religious marketplace, but it cannot demonstrate 
that individual people think in market terms. So long as the advocates 
recognize this restriction, they are on solid ground. (1998:110) 
Such an understanding would enable the model to be dealt with 
hypothetically to "establish whether a postulated structure or mechanism exists 
and operates in the manner suggested" (Blaikie, 2000:10) as well as providing the 
basis for the ethnographic studies that Ammerman and qthers saw so clearly was 
needed. 
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The model's ability to take seriously the impact of culture on the religious 
market is another factor- that will determine its usefulness. A way forward here, 
could be found in the distinction between "preferences" (needs) and choices 
referred to by Spikard (1998:106). There may be certain basic needs that are 
universal (and stable) but choices of how these needs may be met are shaped by 
cultural factors and therefore are particular and unstable. 
Such a distinction may also enable those who support the model to be more 
able to recognize that choices made at the "low tension" end of the market may be 
genuinely religious though possibly not supportive of the existing religious 
' "firms" '. 
Finally, the model would need to recognize more fully the role of religious 
experience and the affective dimension as both shaping and being shaped by 
beliefs and ideas. In its present form it is so heavily cognitive in its understanding 
of religious behaviour at the micro-social level that, while giving lip service to the 
emotional and poetic, it cannot fulfill its authors' aims to take seriously religious 
phenomena without explaining it away. 
Whether it will prove possible to develop the paradigm (?model) in these 
ways so that it can provide the level of abstraction needed for a new theory of the 
sociology of religion without it losing the essence of what we seek to study, is yet 
to be established. We would be foolish not to imagine that there is a very real 
threat in the paradigm as currently enunciated. But perhaps this "Phantom 
Menace", once unmasked, and its destructive aspects recognized, can still be most 
useful in the sociological endeavour. 
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